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Case Note
THE SCOPE OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 2(b)
United States v. Ruffin, 613 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1979)
The United States Court of Appealsfor the Second Circuit
recently interpreted section 2(b) of title 18 of the United States
Code in a way which enlarged the scope of accomplice liability.
In United States v. Ruflfm, a defendant who lacked the capacity
to violate a substantive federal statute was convictedfor willfully
causing the commission of the criminal act by an innocent person
who did, however, possess the statutorily required capacity to vio-
late the statute. This Note examines the majority and minority
opinions in Ruffin and the legislative history of section 2(b) to
determine whether the court's decision was consistent with con-
gressional intent. The Note also discusses trial court procedural
irregularities which could have provided the groundsfor reversal
based on violations of the defendant's fifh and sixth amendment
rights.
INTRODUCTION
Accomplice liability is the general principle of criminal law
which provides for the conviction of a person who procures or
assists another to commit a crime.' Under the early common law,
it was impossible to convict an accomplice without first convicting
the principal.2 Subsequent developments in criminal law, how-
ever, have made it unnecessary to obtain the principal's conviction
as a prerequisite to convicting the accomplice.' Today, a defend-
ant may be punished as a principal even for causing an innocent
agent to commit a criminal act.4
Section 2(b) of title 18 of the United States Code prohibits one
from willfully causing another to commit an act which if directly
performed by the defendant or another would violate a federal
1. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 495-98, 502 (1972).
2. See Sayre, Criminal Responsibilityfor the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REv. 689,
695 (1930).
3. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 1, at 499.
4. See notes 76-111 infra and accompanying text.
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criminal statute.5 Recently, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit enlarged the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) in
United States v. Ruffin.6 In Ruffin, a defendant who lacked the
capacity to violate a substantive statute was held criminally liable
as a principal for willfully causing another to commit criminal
acts for which the other person, though acquitted, possessed the
requisite capacity.7
This Note will analyze the reasoning of the majority and dis-
senting opinions in Ruffln to determine whether the court ex-
ceeded the limits set by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 2.8 Particular
attention will be given to the language and the legislative history
of the statute to determine congressional intent regarding the
criminal liability of one who does not directly commit the actual
criminal offense. In addition to these substantive issues raised by
Ruffin, this Note will discuss procedural irregularities at the trial
which could arguably have justified a remand on appeal.9 Fi-
nally, this Note will examine the potential ramifications of the
Ruffin decision upon federal criminal law.1
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY FROM ITS
COMMON LAW ORIGINS
The participants in the commission of a crime are distinctly
classified according to whether they actually perpetrate the offense
or whether they aid the perpetrator before, during, or after its
commission." The common law generally classified these parties
as either principals or accessories. 2 The sole exception was that
all parties to misdemeanors were held as principals, and conse-
quently, the guilt or innocence of each defendant was independent
of that of the other participants.1 3 The parties to a felony, how-
ever, were classified more precisely because of the seriousness of
the offenses and punishments involved.14 The actual perpetrator
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1976); see note 28 infra.
6. 613 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1979).
7. See notes 95-111 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 95-140 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 141-77 infra and accompanying text.
10. See part IV infra.
11. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note I, at 495-98.
12. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 1, at 495-98; 1 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAW 157-75 (14th ed. 1978).
13. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 1, at 495-98; 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 12, at
157-75. See, e.g., R. v. Burton, 32 L.T.R. (n.s.) 539, 541 (1875); State v. Hunter 79 S.C. 73,
60 S.E. 240 (1908).
14. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 1, at 499. Under the common law, a principal
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of the offense was classified as a principal in the first degree,' 5
while an aider or abettor was classified as a principal in the second
degree or accessory before the fact, the former requiring presence
at the commission of the crime. 1 6
Since all principals and accessories could be convicted and
punished for the commission of the crime, procedural distinctions
arose to protect accessories not present at the commission of the
crime from receiving the same punishment given to those actually
present.' 7 The most significant of these procedural distinctions
was the requirement that the principal offender be convicted to
obtain the conviction of an accessory to a crime. 8 If the principal
had been acquitted, fled, died, or for any other reason escaped
conviction, prosecution of the accessory was barred. During the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, this procedural require-
ment became less rigid as punishment for felonies became less
harsh. '9
In 1848 it became possible in England for an accessory before
the fact to be "indicted, tried, convicted, and punished in all re-
spects as if he were a principal felon."2 Thus, an accessory could
be convicted despite the principal's acquittal.2 ' The conviction of
in the first degree either committed the felony personally or did so through an innocent or
irresponsible agent; a principal in the second degree, present at the commission of the fel-
ony, aided and abetted in its commission; an accessory before the fact aided and abetted
the felon but was not present at the commission of the felony; and an accessory after the
fact, not present at the commission of the felony, aided the felon in avoiding punishment.
These distinctions have been largely abrogated by statute, so that a principal and accessory
are interchangeably referred to as "principal," "accomplice," or "party." See generally id.
at 495-98; 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 12, at 157-75.
Although the common law distinctions between principals and accessories have been
largely eliminated by modem statutes, it has been suggested that the term "principal"
should be discarded. The American Law Institute, in drafting the Model Penal Code,
noted that it "seems unnecessary... in framing an entire system to declare that the of-
fender is a 'principal,' language that has meaning only because of the special backgound of
the common law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04, Comment at 14 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
15. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 1, at 499.
16. See note 14 supra.
17. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note I, at 499.
18. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 623-24 (1847), cited in Standefer v. United
States, 447 U.S. 10, 15 (1980).
19. See, e.g., An Act for Punishing of Accessories to Felonies and the Receivers of
Stolen Goods and to prevent the wilful burning and destroying of ships, I Anne. c.9 (1702);
An Act for Improving the Administration of Criminal Justice in England, 7 Geo. 4, c.64,
§ 9 (1826). See also 2 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 235 (1883); Sayre,
supra note 2, at 695 nn.24-26 (1930).
20. An Act for the Removal of Defects in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 11
& 12 Vict., c.46, § 1 (1848).
21. R. v. Hughes, I L.T.R. (n.s.) 450, 452 (1860).
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an accessory, however, still required proof that the crime had been
committed, even if the perpetrator's identity was unknown.22 In
proving the commission of a crime, the State needed to prove only
that the perpetrator, known or unknown, committed the actus reus
of the crime; the perpetrator's mens rea was immaterial.23 This
flexibility allowed the prosecution to proceed against an accessory
where the mens rea of the principal could not be proven because
of his or her unavailability,24 but where the actus reus could be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A rule which barred the con-
viction of the accessory in these situations would have contra-
vened the developing policy of determining an accessory's liability
independently of the principal's liability, "in all respects as if he
were a principal felon."
25
Beginning in 1850, most state legislatures in the United States
enacted provisions similar to those in England which allowed the
conviction of an accessory despite the principal's acquittal.26 To-
day only four states have clearly retained the early common law
requirement that the principal's conviction is a prerequisite to the
conviction of an accessory.' Similarly, this early common law
requirement has been abolished with respect to federal crimes.
Title 18, section 2 of the United States Code provides for the con-
viction of an accomplice to a crime,2" even though the actual per-
petrator has not been convicted.29 Recently, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit extended the scope of
22. R. v. Gregory, L.R., 1 Cr. Cas. Res. 77 (1869).
23. See Note, Proof of Principal Offences and Liability of Secondary Party, 90 L.Q.
REv. 314, 315 (1974).
24. Id.
25. 11 & 12 Vict., c.46, § 1 (1848).
26. See, e.g., Cal. Stat. Ch. 99, §§ 11-12 (1850), which has been interpreted as abolish-
ing the common law distinctions between principals and accessories. People v. Bears, 10
Cal. 68, 70 (1858).
27. The states which require conviction of a principal in order to convict an accessory
are Maryland (MD. CraM. LAW CODE ANN. art. 27 (1957)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-5 (1969)), Rhode Island (R.I. GEN., LAWS § 11-1-3 (1969)), and Tennessee
(TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-107 to 110 (1975)).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 2 provides in full:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against The United States or aids, abets, coun-
sels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a prin-
cipal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by
him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable
as a principal.
18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
29. See notes 56-60 & 76-94 infra and accompanying text.
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accomplice liability. In United States v. Ruffin,3" an accomplice
without the capacity to violate the substantive statute was held
criminally liable as a principal for willfully causing another to
commit criminal acts for which the other person, though acquit-
ted, had the requisite capacity.
3 1
II. THE FACTS IN RUFFIN
Olga Defreitas, the executive director of an agency, which re-
ceived federal funds under the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964,32 was a close personal friend of William Ruffin. In 1969
Ruffin purchased a condemned, uninhabitable building in Brook-
lyn, New York.33 Knowing that Defreitas' agency needed addi-
tional space for its program, he persuaded her to obtain approval
from the agency's board of directors to lease the building from
him. 4 The agency entered into an agreement to lease the building
"as is" from Ruffin, and Ruffin agreed to pay one-half of the reno-
vation costs up to $35,000.11 Subsequently, the agency procured a
private contractor to undertake the renovation. The contractor,
however, breached the renovation contract.36 Once again
unusable, the building was slated for demolition by the New York
City Department of Buildings. 37 Although Ruffin applied for and
received extensions of the demolition order, he did not attempt to
renovate the building.38 Ruflin also induced Defreitas to obtain
approval from the agency's board of directors to continue leasing
the building for four more years. 39 During this time, Ruffin re-
30. 613 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1979).
31. Id. at 417.
32. Ms. Defreitas directed the Young Mothers Training Program (YMP), a delegate
agency which received federal funding through the Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth Youth-in-
Action Community Corporation (BSYIA) under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1976). 613 F.2d at 410.
33. 613 F.2d at 410.
34. Id.
35. Brief for Appellee at 9. United States v. Ruffin, Docket No. 78-1361 (2d Cir. Jan.
15, 1979).
36. The contractor, Lima Construction Co., was subsequently sued by the BSYIA,
which obtained a judgment against Lima for breach of contract. Brief for Appellee at 9.
37. Superseding Indictment, Synopsis of Evidence at 1, United States v. Ruffin, No.
77-Cr-182(S) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1978).
38. Id.
39. After an internal investigation, the BSYIA discontinued its payments to Ruffin.
Shortly thereafter, however, YMP became a fiscally independent delegate agency, whose
board of directors were induced by Defreitas to lease the condemned building. Brief for
Appellee at 9-10 (citing Trial Transcript at 152 and Defendant's Exhibits KK-NN); 613
F.2d at 410.
390 [Vol. 31:386
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ceived a total of $115,000 in rental payments from which he made
concurrent payments of approximately $30,000 to Defreitas.4 °
Shortly before the fourth lease was to expire, officials of the
New York City Human Resources Administration (responsible
for disbursing funds through the Economic Opportunity Act) in-
advertently discovered that Defreitas' agency had been paying
rent to Ruffin for his unusable building.4 Following investiga-
tion, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New
York charged Defreitas with fraudulently and willfully misapply-
ing federal funds in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2703.42 The District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, however, acquitted
Defreitas upon a finding of not guilty by the jury.43
Ruffin was charged and convicted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2 4
for willfully causing the commission of a crime by an innocent
agent.4" Since Ruffin was not an employee, officer, or connected
in any capacity with Defreitas' agency, he could not be charged
with a substantive violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2703. Despite his inca-
pacity to commit the substantive offense involved, however, Ruf-
fin was convicted as an accomplice to that offense under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2.46
III. THE DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE OF ACCOMPLICE
LIABILITY UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 2
Prior to 1909, no federal statute specifically permitted the pros-
ecution of one who aided and abetted another in the commission
of a crime .4 7 Rather, various criminal statutes themselves defined
accessory liability with regard to the crimes they proscribed.
40. Ruffin deposited the money in his and Defreitas' personai accounts. 613 F.2d at
410.
41. Brief for Appellee at 15.
42. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 2703 (1970) (repealed 1975) provided in pertinent part:
Whoever, being an officer, director, agent, or employee of, or connected with, any
agency receiving financial assistance under this chapter embezzles, willfully mis-
applies, steals, or obtains by fraud any of the moneys, funds, assets, or property
which are the subject of a grant or contract of assistance pursuant to this chapter,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years,
or both.
43. 613 F.2d at 409, 412.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). See note 28 supra.
45. 613 F.2d at 412. Defreitas and Ruffin were also charged with and acquitted of
conspiracy to obtain funds by fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). Id. at 409.
46. 613 F.2d at 412.
47. 613 F.2d at 421.
48. See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 162 U.S. 664, 669-70 (1896) (where a federal
banking statute, Rev. Stat. § 5207 (1874), allowed the conviction of an accessory for aiding
1981]
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The original version of 18 U.S.C. § 2, the Act of March 4, 1909,4"
grouped these accessory liability provisions into a single federal
statutory provision. Under its terms, any individual who aided,
abetted, or procured the commission of any federal criminal of-
fense could be prosecuted as a principal."0 The legislative history
of the Act indicates that Congress intended to abrogate the com-
mon law distinctions between principals and accessories to felo-
nies, rendering all aiders and abettors subject to punishment as
principals.5' This legislation, therefore, provided the first general
federal codification of the common law provision which allowed
the conviction of an accomplice notwithstanding the absence of
the principal's conviction.52
Congress revised and clarified the federal criminal code in
1948.11 The terms of the Act of 1909, however, remained essen-
tially the same,54 indicating that Congress saw no need to revise
the aiding and abetting provision. Such congressional acquies-
cence may be construed as affirming judicial interpretations which
did not require the conviction of the actual perpetrator of the
crime to convict the aider and abettor.
and abetting a guilty principal, even though he lacked the requisite capacity to violate the
statute directly).
49. Ch. 321, § 332, 35 Stat. 1152 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976)). See note 28
srupra.
50. The 1909 Act provided in pertinent part: "Whoever directly commits any act con-
stituting an offense defined in any law of the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, com-
mands, induces, or procures its commission, is a principal." The Act of March 4, 1909, Ch.
321, § 332, 35 Stat. 1152.
51. H.R. REP. No. 2, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1908); S. REP. No. 10, 60th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 13 (1908); COMM'N TO REVISE AND CODIFY THE LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, FINAL REPORT 118-19 (1906). The Chairman of the Joint Committee on the Revi-
sion of the Laws, Representative Moon, stated, "[We] have abolished the existing arbitrary
distinctions between felonies and misdemeanors." 42 CONG. REC. 585 (1908). 4ccord,
Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620, 628 (1926) (the statute "abolishe[d] the distinction
between principals and accessories and [made] them all principals").
52. Cf., Beauchamp v. United States, 154 F.2d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1946) (it is "not
necessary that the principal be first convicted before bringing to trial one charged with
aiding and abetting"); Kelly v. United States, 258 F. 392, 402 (6th Cir. 1919) ("where per-
sons were formerly chargeable as aiders and abettors, they may be indicted and prosecuted
as principals, whether the principal offender has been indicted and acquitted . or has
not been indicted at all").
53. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 684 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-5037 (1976)).
54. Compare the relevant text of the Act of 1909, supra note 50, with § 2(a) as revised:
"Whoever commits an offense against the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, com-
mands, induces or procures its commission, is a principal." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645
§ 2(a), 62 Stat. 684 (amended 1951) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2) (1976); see note 28
supra.
55. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978).
[Vol. 31:386
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Despite this apparent congressional intent, federal courts con-
tinued to disagree as to the criminality of an aider and abettor
whose principal had not been convicted.56 Recently, the United
States Supreme Court resolved this conflict by sustaining the con-
viction of an aider and abettor under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a), notwith-
standing the acquittal of the only possible principal offender. In
Standefer v. United States,5 7 the defendant was convicted of aid-
ing and abetting the bribery of an Internal Revenue Service
agent.5 8 The Court reasoned that all participants in federal of-
fenses are independently "punishable for their criminal conduct,"
since 18 U.S.C. § 2 defines them equally as "principals".59 This
reasoning allowed the Court to conclude that the fate of other par-
ticipants in the substantive crime is irrelevant under the statute.6 °
Thus, the Supreme Court clearly established that the acquittal of
the actual perpetrator of a crime does not bar the conviction of an
aider and abettor under section 2(a).6 '
The addition of section 2(b) to title 18 extended the scope of
accomplice liability by expanding the "procurement" element of
section 2(a). The new section prohibited one from "caus[ing] an
act to be done, which if directly performed by [the causer] would
be an offense against the United States.' 62 Congress intended this
section to punish one who cuased an innocent intermediary or
agent to commit a crime.63 Although it seems paradoxical to find
that an innocent agent has committed a crime,6 the justification
56. See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 579 F.2d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 1978) (proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that a specific person is a principal is not necessary for convic-
tion of the aider and abettor, it is necessary only to prove that the offense was committed by
some principal); United States v. Prince, 430 F.2d 1324, 1325 (4th Cir. 1970) (per curiam)
(conviction of aider and abettor barred by acquittal of only possible principal, despite
proof of actus reus), citing Meredith v. United States, 238 F.2d 535, 542 (4th Cir. 1956)
("conviction of the principal actor is not a prerequisite to conviction of the aider and abet-
tor").
57. 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
58. Id. at 13.
59. Id. at 20.
60. Id.
61. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645 § 2(b) 62 Stat. 684, as amended by Act of Oct. 31,
1951, ch. 655, § 17(b), 65 Stat. 717 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 2(b) (1976)).
62. Id.
63. A House report explained that this section
removes all doubt that one who puts in motion or assists in the illegal enterprise
[or] causes the commission of an indispensable element of the offense by an inno-
cent agent or instrumentality, is guilty as a principal even though he intentionally
refrained from the direct act constituting the completed offense.
H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. AS. See also note 67 infra.
64. See ag., United States v. Prince, 430 F.2d 1324, 1325 (4th Cir. 1970) (per curiam)
1981]
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for this proposition lies in the mens rea-actus reus dichotomy of
criminal law.
Criminal law defines every crime in terms of the mens rea and
actus reus of the offender. Thus, criminal acts have two elements:
the intent and the act.65 Although some crimes impose objective
intent (without regard to the actor's actual state of mind), a pro-
scribed act is criminal only when accompanied by criminal in-
tent.6 If a criminal act is performed by an innocent agent, that
agent is not guilty of the crime because he or she lacks criminal
intent. The one who willfully causes the innocent agent to perpe-
trate the offense, however, harbors the requisite criminal intent.
Since the "causer" intends the commission of the crime, and
manipulates the innocent agent to perform the act, he or she is
held responsible for the crime. 67 If the rules were otherwise, the
person actually responsible for the crime's commission would not
be punished. Although Congress intended to ensure the punish-
ment, as a principal, of one who "causes the commission of an
indispensable element of the offense by an innocent agent," 68 fed-
eral courts differed as to whether the "causer" needed to have the
capacity to commit the substantive offense.69 A literal reading of
the language, "if directly performed by him would be an offense,"
appears to limit criminal liability only to those causers who could
directly commit the defined crime.7" Many courts, however, re-
sisted this interpretation and held that although a defendant was
personally incapable of committing the crime,7 1 section 2(b) al-
lowed his or her conviction for procuring innocent agents to com-
(where the court stated that there could be no crime since the only possible principal was
acquitted).
65. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 1, at 496.
66. Id.
67. United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68, 73 (6th Cir. 1966). While section 2(b) of title
18 is used ordinarily to convict an accomplice if the perpetrator is acquitted, it is apparently
not limited to situations involving an innocent agent. If the agent is "guilty", however, it is
unclear whether the "causer" may adopt the agent's mens rea. This may be important in
the determination of whether the conduct "if directly performed by him" would have been
criminal. See Model Penal Code § 2.04(2)(a), Comment (Tent Draft No. !, 1953); see, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947).
68. See note 63 supra.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1950).
70. 613 F.2d at 425 (Wyatt, J., dissenting).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Selph, 82 F. Supp. 56, 60 (S.D. Cal. 1949) (even though
the defendant lacked the capacity to violate directly the Serviceman's Readjustment Act,
an indictment under that Act charging the defendant with causing a bank mistakenly to
certify certain claims was sufficient).
[Vol. 31:386
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mit the crime.7 2 Other courts doubted whether Congress had
intended section 2(b) to enlarge the scope of accomplice liability
in this manner. According to Judge Learned Hand, "[I]n spite of
the cogency of the verbal argument that can be made to the con-
trary, we cannot bring ourselves to be sure that such baffling lan-
guage was intended to have so revolutionary a consequence." 73
Rather, it "appear[s] in general not to contemplate more than a
restatement of already existing law."'74
In response to the concern that "[c]riminal statutes should be
definite and certain," 75 Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) in
195 1.76 The 1951 amendment provided for the conviction of one
who caused an act to be done which "if directly performed by him
or another"'77 would violate a substantive criminal statute.78 Al-
though Congress intended to eliminate the existing confusion in
the lower federal courtS,79 the 1951 amendment failed to resolve
the problem.8"
A basic tenet of statutory construction is that every word,
clause, or phrase of a statute is given full effect so that it is neither
inoperative nor superfluous.8 1 It is therefore assumed that Con-
72. See, e.g., Boushea v. United States, 173 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1949) (defendants were
convicted for causing an innocent agent to submit a false claim under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, although they lacked the capacity to violate the Act directly). Even before
the enactment of the 1951 amendment, it had been held that although a "defendant was
incompetent to commit the offense as principal by reason of not being of a particular age,
sex, condition, or class, he may, nevertheless, be punished as a procurer (causer) or abet-
tor." United States v. Snyder, 14 F. 554, 556 (C.C.D. Minn. 1882).
73. United States v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903, 910 (2d Cir. 1950). -
74. Id. Judge Hand's opinion is supported by a House report which states that the
provision was "added to permit the deletion from many sections throughout the revision of
such phrases as 'causes or procures' "--terms which had generally been used synony-
mously. H.R. RP. No. 304, supra note 63, at A5.
75. S. REP. No. 1020, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1951] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2578, 2583.
76. Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 17(b), 65 Stat. 717.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. The amendment provided in part: "Whoever willfully causes an act to be done
which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United
States is punishable as as principal." Id.
79. See S. REP. No. 1020, supra note 75, at 7, reprintedin [1951] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 2583.
80. E.g., compare United States v. Giordano, 489 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1973) (an acces-
sory cannot be convicted unless the principal is found guilty) with United States v. Inciso,
292 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1961) (defendant could be convicted of causing an innocent princi-
pal to violate federal statute), and United States v. One 6.5 man. Mannlicher-Carcano Mili-
tary Rifle, 250 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Tex. 1966) (one who commits an offense may be
regarded as an agent whose conviction is unnecessary to convict the accessory who causes
the offense to be committed).
81. 2 A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CNSTRUCTION 63 (1973). See also United States
1981]
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gress does not include language in a statute which is irrelevant.8 2
Thus, the language added to the statute seems meaningless unless
it is interpreted to relieve the causer of the capacity requirement.1
3
Accordingly, it would have been unnecessary to amend the statute
if it did not intend to broaden the scope of accomplice liability. 4
It appears, therefore, that Congress intended to ensure the convic-
tion of causers regardless of their capacity to commit the substan-
tive offense.8 5
Many federal courts, following the lead of the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Lester, 6 have adopted this
"plain meaning" interpretation of section 2(b). 87 Although the de-
fendants in Lester were legally incapable of committing the sub-
stantive offense involved, the court upheld their convictions under
a conspiracy statute for causing innocent intermediaries to commit
the offense. 8 The court's reliance on the words "or another," ad-
ded to section 2(b) of title 18 of the U.S.C. in 1951, allowed it to
conclude that it was "beyond controversy" that the defendants
could adopt the capacity of one within the reach of the substantive
offense.89
Although Lester involved a conspiracy prosecution, its holding
has not been limited to that type of prosecution. In United States
v. Wiseman,9 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
defendants, who lacked the capacity to commit a substantive of-
v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 145 (1975) ("The canon in favor of strict construction [of criminal
statutes] is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory
purpose.").
82. See 2 A. SUTHERLAND, srupra note 81, at 57.
83. See text accompanying notes 98-102 infra.
84. Id.
85. The Senate report which accompanied the amendment stated that the amended
section was "intended to clarify and make certain the intent to punish aiders and abettors
regardless of the fact that they may be incapable of committing the specific violation which
they are charged to have aided and abetted." S. REP. No. 1020, supra note 75, at 7 reprinted
in [1951] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2583.
86. 363 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1966).
87. See note 80 supra.
88. 363 F.2d at 72. The defendants caused police officers to arrest and imprison the
victim, knowing him to be innocent, in contravention of the federal criminal code. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 242, 371 (1976).
89. 363 F.2d at 73. The court held:
It has been beyond controversy, then, at least since the 1951 amendment to 18
U.S.C. § 2(b), that the accused may be convicted as causer, even though not le-
gally capable of personally committing the act forbidden by a Federal statute, and
even though the agent willfully caused to do the criminal act is himself guiltless of
any crime.
Id.
90. 445 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1971).
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fense, were nonetheless punishable as principals for causing inno-
cent intermediaries to commit the offense. 9' The appellants in
Wiseman had been convicted pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 2(b) for will-
fully causing a court clerk to enter default judgments against per-
sons who had never received notice of the pending actions.92 The
appellants argued that they could not be convicted under 18
U.S.C. § 2(b) because they lacked the capacity to violate 18 U.S.C.
§ 242.93 The Wiseman court, however, followed Lester and held
that the appellants had adopted the capacity of "another" (in this
case, the clerk) who could violate section 242.14 It then deter-
mined the appellants' culpability by what would have been the
culpability of the clerk if he had actually had the same intent and
knowledge as the appellants. Thus, the court in Wiseman held
that persons causing an innocent intermediary to commit a sub-
stantive offense were punishable as principals, despite their inca-
pacity to commit the offense directly.
IV. THE EXTENSION OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY IN RUFFIN
The courts in Wiseman and Lester utilized the "plain mean-
ing" of 18 U.S.C. § 2 to justify an extension of section 2(b) to a
defendant who lacked the capacity to commit the relevant sub-
stantive offense. The majority and dissenting opinions in Ruffin,
however, relied heavily on the legislative history of the Act to as-
certain the congressional intent expressed in the statute. Conse-
quently, the Ruffin opinions provide a more comprehensive
foundation for the expression of section 2(b) than do those of
Wiseman and Lester.
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority in Ruffin extended criminal liability to a behind-
the-scences manipulator who caused an innocent agent to commit
the actus reus of a crime.9" To reach its conclusion, the majority
91. Id. at 794-95.
92. Id. at 794. This action violated 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976).
93. Section 242 of title 18 extends only to those acting "under color of any law...."
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976).
94. 445 F.2d at 795. The court held:
The phrase 'or another includes the Clerk of the Civil Court. Thus if defendants
'willfully caused' the Clerk to enter such judgments, defendants would be culpa-
ble to the same extent as the Clerk would be assuming the Clerk had the same
knowledge as was possessed by defendants as to the falsity of the papers.
Id.
95. 613 E2d.at 413.
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assumed that a criminal act could be caused (by an accomplice)
despite acquittal of the principal for the substantive offense. Thus,
even though Defreitas was not convicted under 42 U.S.C. § 2703,
the evidence could still show that Ruflin had committed a crime.
The record indicated that the jury acquitted Defreitas because it
found that she lacked the necessary criminal intent, not because of
the absence of a criminal act.96 Since the jury also decided that
Ruffin had the requisite criminal intent,97 the majority sustained
his conviction.9"
Not only did the majority combine the principal's actus reus
with the accomplice's criminal intent in extending criminal liabil-
ity to the causer, but the majority also allowed Ruffin to adopt his
innocent agent's legal capacity to violate 42 U.S.C. § 2703. Ruffin
was not within the class contemplated by 42 U.S.C. § 2703, and
therefore he was incapable of violating that statute by himself.99
Nevertheless, the majority held that Ruffm could adopt Defreitas'
capacity to violate section 2703 despite her acquittal. 00 This
transference of the innocent agent's capacity led the majority to
conclude that a causer, who lacks the capacity to commit a pro-
scribed crime directly, can commit it indirectly through the acts of
another. o
The majority derived support for its extension of criminal lia-
bility to Ruffin from the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 2. Prior
to the 1951 amendment, it would have been unclear whether Ruf-
fin could have been convicted, since the act "if directly performed
by him" would not have been "an offense against the United
States."' 2 The majority reasoned, however, that the addition of
the words "or another" to the phrase "if directly performed by
him" permitted Ruffin's conviction, 03 since the act, if performed
by Defreitas ("another"), would have been criminal if she had had
Ruffin's criminal intent."°4 The majority also noted that if Ruffin
were required to possess the capacity to commit the substantive
96. Id.
97. Id. at 412. The jury found that Ruffin had willfully caused the commission of the
crime through an innocent intermediary.
98. The majority stated that "the record in this case would permit an inference that
Ruffin caused Defreitas.. . to engage in the alleged criminal conduct." Id. at 413.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 414-15.
103. Id.
104. The majority stated: "As amended, ... the phrase 'which if directly performed
... by another . . .' (emphasis added) covers the present case since the criminal act, if
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offense directly, the addition of "or another" would have been
"meaningless surplusage."' 5 Furthermore, the majority con-
cluded that "absent this sensible interpretation of § 2(b) . . . we
do not find any logical reason, nor has one been offered by appel-
lant, for the addition of the words 'or another' to that section in
195 1.1,o6
The majority drew additional support for its conclusion from
the interpretation given to section 2(b) in Lester and in Wise-
man.0 7 In these cases, as in Ruffin, the courts upheld the causers'
convictions despite the causers' incapacity to commit the substan-
tive offense and despite the acquittal of the principal who pos-
sessed the requisite capacity. 08 In all three cases, the evidence
showed that the accomplice had caused an innocent agent to com-
mit an unlawful act.'0 9 In Lester and Wiseman, the courts had
held that the 1951 amendment to section 2(b) imputed the capac-
ity of the innocent agent to the causer."10 In analyzing a similar
fact pattern in Ruffin, the majority noted, "[t]his reasoning applies
with equal force to the present case.""' Ruffin, like the defend-
ants in Lester and Wiseman, caused the commission of a criminal
act; the majority opinion sustaining his conviction is therefore
consistent with those decisions.
B. The Dissenting Opinion
In contrast to the majority, the dissenting judge asserted that
the acquittal of the only person capable of committing the charged
substantive offense implied that no crime had in fact occurred;
where there was no crime, there could be no accomplice. 1 2 Not-
ing that an indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 2 must be joined with an
indictment for a substantive offense,' 13 the dissenter claimed that
there could be no substantive offense without the existence of a
guilty principal. I" Where the perpetrator of the crime is an inno-
committed by 'another' (i.e., Defreitas), would be such an offense, even though the other
lacked the intent to commit the crime." Id.
105. Id. at 415-16.
106. Id. at 415.
107. Id.
108. See notes 86-94 supra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 32-46 & 86-94 supra and accompanying text.
110. See notes 86-94 supra and accompanying text.
111. 613 F.2d at 415.
112. Id. at 426. Cf. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262, 265 (1963) ("there can
be no conviction for aiding and abetting someone to do an innocent act").
113. Id. Cf. United States v. Campbell, 426 F.2d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1970).
114. 613 F.2d at 425.
1981)
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cent agent, the causer is the only possible guilty principal. 15 If,
however, the causer lacks the capacity to commit the substantive
offense, he or she cannot be convicted as a princpal and thus, there
can be no crime. 116
Despite the dissenting judge's concession that the evidence was
"more than sufficient" to justify Ruffin's punishment, "7 he rea-
soned that the 1951 amendment to section 2(b) did not authorize
the transfer of the capacity to commit the substantive offense from
the innocent intermediary to the causer."' He further contended
that the majority's literal interpretation of section 2(b) "'stick[s]
too closely to the letter' and fails to reach the 1951 amendment 'in
light of the mischief to be corrected' by that amendment."" ' 9 That
"mischief," according to the dissent, was the disagreement then
prevalent as to whether an aider and abettor could be prosecuted
under section 2(a), absent that person's capacity to commit the rel-
evant substantive offense.' 2° The dissenter asserted that Congress
intended the amendment to ensure that no one would infer, on the
basis of section 2(b), that section 2(a) required the aider and abet-
tor to have the requisite capacity.' 2'
The Senate report accompanying the 1951 amendment ap-
pears to support the dissenting interpretation of congressional in-
tent. In referring to section 2(b), it states:
Section 2(b) of title 18 is limited by the phrase, "which if di-
rectly performed by him would be an offense against the
United States," to persons capable of committing the specific
offense. Section 2(a) of such title, while not containing that lan-
guage, is open to the inference that it also is limited in
application to persons who could commit the substantive of-
fense. 122
Moreover, the report acknowledges that the purpose of the
115. Id. Cf. United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 1973).
116. 613 F.2d at 417. The dissenting opinion stressed the following point several times:
"The causer cannot be a principal because of lack of capacity. The intermediary cannot be
a principal because, though possessing capacity, he or she is innocent. Without a principal
there can be no violation of the substantive statute." Id. at 426.
117. Id. at 417.
118. He also indicated that "there is other disagreement to be noted, but it is less im-
portant." Id.
119. Id. at 425-26 (quoting Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 158-59 (1934)).
120. Id. at 426.
121. The dissenter recognized that "[tihere were some changes in 1951 to Section 2(b)
as well as to Section 2(a). . .however, the changes made to 2(b). . . were solely to avoid
in the interpretation of Sectin 2(a) any inference from the wording of 2(b)." Id. at 425.
122. S. REP. No. 1020, supra note 75, at 7, reprinted in [1951] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 2583.
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amendment is "to clarify and make certain the intent to punish
aiders and abettors regardless of the fact that they may be incapa-
ble of committing the specific violation which they are charged to
have aided and abetted."' 23 The dissenting judge therefore con-
cluded that Congress did not intend to remove the capacity limita-
tion on section 2(b); rather, it intended to avoid any inference that
section 2(a) was limited in that way.'24 To support his conclusion,
the dissenter emphasized that an accomplice convicted under sec-
tion 2(a) does not need the capacity to commit the substantive of-
fense because that section also requires the conviction of the
actual perpetrator (the guilty principal). 25 On the other hand, be-
cause the actual perpetrator under section 2(b) may be innocent,
the dissenter reasoned that Congress must have intended to distin-
guish this section by requiring a causer to have the capacity to
commit the substantive offense as if he or she were a principal.1
26
In addition to the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 2, the dis-
senter also drew support for his conclusions from the Third Cir-
cuit opinion in United States v. Standefer,27 which stated that "18
U.S.C. § 2 has not altered the rule that in order to convict an aider
and abettor, the government must first demonstrate that a crime
has been committed."' 28 The dissenting judge interpreted this
statement in Standefer as allowing the conviction of an aider and
abettor, who lacked the capacity to commit the substantive of-
fense, under section 2(a) only if the commission of the offense by a
principal who possessed the requisite capacity had been proven. 29
Without this proof, there could be no crime and no accomplice.' 30
Accordingly, the dissenter maintained that the acquittal of
Defreitas indicated that no crime had been committed.' 3'
Notwithstanding the apparent validity of the dissenter's rea-
123. Id.
124. 613 F.2d at 425. The dissenter further stated: "This is not so 'incongruous' as the
majority thinks. On the contrary, it is the reasonable and logical consequence of settled
rules of criminal law, deriving from the classification at common law of parties to crimes
and the reasons for that classification." Id. at 426.
125. Id. See notes 112-16 supra and accompanying text.
126. 613 F.2d at 426.
127. 610 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 10 (1980); see notes 57-60 supra and
accompanying text. The dissenting judge relied, as well, on other judicial precedent. See,
e.g., United States v. Giordano, 489 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1973) (an accessory cannot be con-
victed unless the principal is himself guilty); Girogosian v. United States, 349 F.2d 166 (1st
Cir. 1965) (an aider and abettor cannot be guilty unless the principal is found guilty).
128. 610 F.2d at 1087.
129. 613 F.2d at 424-25.
130. Id.
13. d. at 426-27. The record, however, showed that the jury found that the criminal
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soning, it is flawed in two respects. First, the dissenting judge crit-
icized the majority's literal interpretation of the statute and the
accompanying Senate report as overlooking the "mischief' sought
to be corrected by the 1951 amendment.'32 That mischief, the dis-
senter maintained, was the possible inference from section 2(b)
that section 2(a) required the aider and abettor to have the capac-
ity to commit the substantive crime involved. 33 The dissent, how-
ever, offered no suggestion as to why Congress would follow the
indirect route of adding "or another" to section 2(b) in order to
avoid confusion regarding section 2(a).134 It seems more plausi-
ble, as the majority contended, that Congress amended section
2(b) to affect that section directly, in addition to causing any indi-
rect effect on section 2(a). 135  In other words, the "mischief'
sought to be avoided by Congress was that "causers", such as Ruf-
fin, would not be able to escape punishment because they lacked
the legal capacity to commit the substantive offense. 136
Second, although the dissenter correctly quoted the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Standefer 37 as stating
that conviction of an aider and abettor requires proof "that a
crime has been committed,"'13 8 it failed to note that the Standefer
act had occurred and that it acquitted Defreitas simply because she lacked the requisite
criminal intent. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
132. 613 F.2d at 425-26; see notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text.
133. 613 F.2d at 425-26; see notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text.
134. Indeed, he stated: "That Congress added the words 'or another' to Section 2(b) is,
in light of the legislative history, baffling in the extreme, but I cannot accept that Congress
meant thereby to make such a far-reaching and radical alteration as is found by the major-
ity." 613 F.2d at 425.
135. The majority noted:
Judge Wyatt [dissenting] suggests that the words 'or another' were added to § 2(b)
in order to make it clear that § 2(a) does not require that the aider and abettor
have the capacity to commit the crime as principal. We find it difficult to believe
that Congress would take such a circuitous route to achieve that goal. Rather, we
read the legislative history to indicate that Congress meant to make it clear that
neither 2(a) not 2(b) included a capacity requirement as to the 'aider and abettor'
or 'causer'.
Id. at 416 n.3.
136. While the dissenter asserted that Congress intended the amendment to ensure the
punishment of aiders and abettors regardless of their incapacity to violate the substantive
statute directly, see note 123 supra and accompanying text, the dissenting opinion also
noted: "There has been much confusion in judicial opinions and elsewhere because of the
indiscriminate application of the term 'aider and abettor' to one against whom either Sec-
tion 2(a) or Section 2(b) is invoked." 613 F.2d at 417-18. In light of the legislative history
of the 1951 amendment, the language of the report appears to be another example of such
indiscriminte usage.
137. 610 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 10 (1980); see notes 57-60 & 127-30
supra and accompanying text.
138. 613 F.2d at 425.
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court further explained that where a crime has been proven, Con-
gress intended section 2(a) to abrogate the common law require-
ment that conviction of an aider and abettor depended upon
conviction of the principal.'39 Thus, Standefer does not support
the dissenter's premise that conviction of an accessory depends
upon proof of a crime and conviction of the principal. 140
V. PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES
Although the dissenter's attempt to exclude Ruffin from the
scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) failed, he did indicate certain procedural
irregularities in the trial which provide constitutional grounds for
questioning Ruffin's conviction as a "causer." The indictment
against Ruffin and Defreitas did not specify whether Ruffin was
charged pursuant to section 2(a) or 2(b); rather, it referred merely
to "Title 42, United States Code, Section 2703; and Title 18,
United States Code Section 2."'' 1 Moreover, the trial judge read
both subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 2 as part of the initial jury
charge. 142
The Government based its prosecution upon the joint conspir-
acy of the defendants, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2(a); it intended to
show that Defreitas was guilty and that Ruffin had aided and
abetted her. Indeed, the indictment charged that both defendants
"did knowingly and wilfully misapply and obtain by fraud" fed-
eral funds. 43 The United States Attorney requested the judge to
charge the jury with specific reference to a determination that
Ruffin aided and abetted Defreitas, further demonstrating that the
prosecution based its case on section 2(a).1' During the trial, the
139. 610 F.2d at 1086.
140. The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's decision in Standefer, holding
that "(w)ith the enactment of that section, all participants in conduct violating a federal
criminal statute are 'principals'. As such, they are punishable for their criminal conduct;
the fate of other participants is irrelevant." Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980),
afrO, 610 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1979); see notes 57-60 supra and accompanying text.
141. Superseding Indictment at 5, United States v. Ruffin, No. 77-CR-182(S)
(E.D.N.Y. April 7, 1978).
142. 613 F.2d at 411.
143. Superseding Indictment, supra note 141, at 5.
144. Specifically, the Government requested the judge to charge, in relevant part, as
follows:
The law provides that a person who aids and abets another to commit an offense
is just as guilty of that offense as if he committed it himself. Accordingly, you
may find the defendant William Ruffin guilty. . . ffyoufind beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant Olga Defreitas committed the offenses with which they were
charged in those counts and that the defendant William Ruffin aided and abetted
her.
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Government never advanced the theory that Ruffin merely caused
Defreitas, an innocent agent, to commit the proscribed acts; that
is, there was no indication during the trial that Ruffin could be
convicted under section 2(b). The Government, instead, main-
tained that a "corrupt agreement [existed] between the parties"' 45
and, in its summation at trial, pointed out that "Mr. Ruffin was
the outside man ... [and] Miss Defreitas was the inside wo-
man."'
146
The trial judge instructed the jury: "[Y]ou may find the de-
fendant William Ruffin guilty. . . if you find beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant Olga Defreitas committed the
offenses with which they were charged. . . and that the defendant
William Ruffin aided and abetted her. Otherwise, you must ac-
quit."' 47 Neither the Government nor Ruflm's counsel objected to
this charge. 4 The jury, apparently confused by the charge, delib-
erated briefly and sent the judge a note inquiring as to whether it
was possible to find one defendant guilty and the other not
guilty.'49 The Government then abandoned its initial position
that Ruffin aided and abetted a guilty principal under section
2(a).' 50 It argued that the jury could acquit Defreitas as an inno-
cent intermediary and convict Rufflin as a "causer" under section
2(b). It further argued that the 1951 amendment to section 2(b)
allowed Ruffn's conviction despite his lack of capacity to violate
42 U.S.C. § 2703.15 Ruffin's counsel objected to the Govern-
ment's alteration of its theory of the prosecution.15 2 At first, the
trial judge agreed with the objection and indicated that he would
reply to the jury that it was necessary to convict Defreitas in order
to convict Ruffin. 53 When the Prosecuting Attorney protested
that such an instruction was incorrect, the trial judge admonished:
"You gave it to me. I included your charge."' 5 4 Inexplicably, the
trial judge then deciding that his earlier charge had been too lim-
ited, reinstructed the jury that it could find only one of the defend-
613 F.2d at 418.
145. Defendant-Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 4 (citing Trial Transcript at 22).
146. Id. at 3 (citing Trial Transcript at 1396).
147. 613 F.2d at 419 (quoting Trial Transcript at 1362-64).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 411.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 420.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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ants guilty.1 55
Ruffin's conviction should not stand if the jury misapplied the
law because of these contradictory instructions.' 56 Since the jury
requested reinstruction regarding the conviction of one defendant
despite the acquittal of the other,157 it appears that the jury was
confused. The fact that the jury did convict Ruffin despite
Defreitas' acquittal, however, indicates that the jury (upon rein-
struction) understood that it was not bound to convict him solely
under section 2(a). As the trial and appellate courts agreed, the
jury's inclination, if still confused, would have been to acquit Ruf-
fin (presumably for aiding and abetting) upon acquitting
Defreitas.' 58 Thus, while a more detailed jury instruction initially
could have avoided jury confusion,5 9 the inconsistent jury in-
structions were doubtful grounds for reversal since they did not
appear prejudicial to Ruffin. 6 0
The variance between the theory of prosecution and the theory
of conviction might also have provided constitutional grounds for
reversal. The fifth and sixth amendments to the Constitution
guarantee a criminal defendant the right to be apprised of the
pending charges and to have adequate opportunity to defend
against them.16 ' The relevant portion of the fifth amendment pro-
vides: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury,. . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law. . .. 1,62 The fifth amendment safeguards
a criminal defendant's right to be prosecuted only in strict accord-
ance with those charges handed down by a Grand Jury 63 and is
155. Id.
156. According to the trial court, because the contradictory jury instructions were po-
tentially more harmful to the prosecution than to the defendants, they would probably not
constitute prejudicial error on appeal. Id. at 411-12; see note 160 infra.
157. See notes 147-49 supra and accompanying text.
158. 613 F.2d at 412, 416.
159. See, e.g., 1 E. DEviTT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUC-
TIONS, §§ 11.08, 12.04 (3d ed. 1977).
160. See Pittman v. United States, 368 F.2d 560 (9th cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
995 (1967) (imprecise jury instruction not reversible error since jury was not misled);
Michaud v. United States, 350 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1965) (incorrect jury instruction
favorable to defendant not grounds for reversal). See generally FED. R. CruM. P. 30.
161. See notes 162-73 infra and accompanying text.
162. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
163. See, e.g., Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960) (criminal defendant
held to have a "substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment
returned by a grand jury").
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applied beyond cases of capital or "infamous" crimes. 161 Conse-
quently, Ruffin could not be tried except on those charges re-
turned by a Grand Jury indictment against him. Although the
indictment cited 18 U.S.C. § 2,165 it specifically charged that Ruf-
fin had aided and abetted Defreitas in the commission of the
crime. 166 Ruflin's conviction, however, was based on the prosecu-
tion's revised theory that Ruffin caused Defreitas, an innocent in-
termediary, to commit the proscribed act.' 67 Therefore, it appears
that the court convicted Ruffin for a different offense than that for
which he was indicted, in apparent contravention of his fifth
amendment rights.
The sixth amendment affords criminal defendants additional
rights, including the right "to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation" and the right to be confronted during the trial
with any adverse evidence. 68 The sixth amendment requires that
an indictment must set forth the offense charged in terms sufficient
to allow the defendant the opportunity to prepare an adequate de-
fense. 169 Ruffin, however, could not prepare an adequate defense
to the section 2(b) "causing" charge, since the revised theory of
the prosecution did not arise until after the case had been submit-
ted to the jury. 7 ° Consequently, as the dissenting judge pointed
out on appeal, "Ruffin was never able to determine his strategy
with knowledge of the government's present position."' 7 It is
possible that Ruffin might have been able to secure vindicating
testimony from Defreitas (who elected not to testify) if the Gov-
ernment had not indicted her since, as an innocent intermediary
under section 2(b), her testimony could not have harmed her. 7 2
Similarly, Ruffin might have been able to present evidence that
Defreitas' innocence showed that the substantive offense was
never committed. Ruffin's defense, however, responded only to
the offenses charged by the indictment against him and
164. See, e.g., Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426 (1885) (the fifth amendment pre-
vented abuse of legislative as well as prosecutorial power without specific congressional
declaration that a crime is "infamous").
165. See note 141 supra and accompanying text.
166. See notes 143-46 supra and accompanying text.
167. See notes 149-51 supra and accompanying text.
168. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 868 (1949).
169. Davis v. United States, 357 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 927 (1966).
170. See notes 143-60 supra and accompanying text.
171. 613 F.2d at 428 (Wyatt, J., dissenting).
172. Id.
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Defreitas.173
In sum, although Ruffin probably was guilty of that crime for
which he was ultimately convicted, it appears the dissenter was
correct in urging that "there was a violation of [his] constitutional
rights." 174 As the dissenting opinion emphasized, Ruffin's convic-
tion was based on a theory which was not contained in the indict-
ment, which was not specifically presented at trial, and of which
Ruffin was neither given notice nor the opportunity to defend
against, either before or during the trial. 175 The majority of the
court, however, opposed reversal, apparently because it did not
believe that the procedural irregularities were prejudicial or seri-
ous, especially in light of the sufficiency of the substantive evi-
dence supporting Ruffin's conviction.' 76  Without specifically
addressing the constitutional questions raised by the dissenter, the
majority sustained Ruffin's conviction since the "jury was armed
with a correct statement of the applicable legal principals [sic]"
and there was no "inconsistency" in the resulting conviction. 177
VI. CONCLUSION
The dissenting judge in Ruffin feared that the court's holding
reflected a major change in the application of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) to
federal criminal defendants. Yet, in light of both judicial prece-
dent and congressional intent, allowing a causer to adopt the ca-
pacity of an innocent intermediary seems no more radical than
allowing an aider and abettor under section 2(a) to adopt the ca-
pacity of the acquitted principal. Indeed, public policy requires
conviction of one who assists in the commission of a criminal act,
even if the actual perpetrator is not convicted. It seems well
within the same bounds of public policy to allow conviction of one
who causes the commission of a criminal act by an innocent per-
petrator, regardless of the causer's capacity to commit the offense
directly. In both situations, the crime has been proven; whether
one causes or assists in that crime, the same interest in deterrence
applies.
Notably, the scope of accomplice liability under Ruffin re-
mains limited to those situations where a criminal act has been
proven. Extension of the majority's reasoning to situations where
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the only possible perpetrator has been acquitted because of lack of
evidence of a crime or legal incapacity would seem contrary to the
public policy of protecting persons from conviction where proof of
the crime has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. In
cases, however, where one who lacks criminal intent is dominated
and manipulated by another who purposely perpetrates a crime
through that intermediary, it would seem equally against the pub-
lic interest to allow the causer's acquittal merely because he or she
lacks the capacity to commit the crime directly. Congress has pro-
vided for a conviction under these circumstances by enacting 18
U.S.C. § 2(b); United States v. Ruffin provides a well-reasoned
enunciation of this mandate.
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